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Senior Economist
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Kalamazoo, Michigan
Hearing on 
Fair Reduction-in-Force (RIF) Practice Act of 1984 (H.R. 6080)
Before the
U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service 
Subcommittee on Human Resource
September 13, 1984
My name is Wayne Wendling. I am a Senior Economist with the W. E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Upjohn Institute 
is an endowed, nonprofit organization that has been conducting research in the 
broad areas of employment and unemployment since 1945.
My comments on Reductions-in-Force (RIFs) and H.R. 6080 will be directed 
primarily to the role of collective bargaining. In so doing, I will rely on 
experiences and practices in the private sector. My discussion of private 
sector initiatives is based on my book, The Plant Closure Policy Dilemma: 
Labor, Law and Bargaining.!
I. AN OVERVIEW
The private sector equivalent of RIFs, plant closures or large scale 
permanent layoffs, is a very difficult problem for which to devise an 
acceptable solution. Perhaps the root of the difficulty is complex 
philosophical questions it raises.
* Should the rights of owners of physical capital automatically take 
precedence over the rights of owners of human capital?
* Although the mobility of workers and physical capital are both
considered to enhance efficiency, is it equitable to place restrictions 
on the latter and not the former?
* Are companies and workers equally positioned to respond to economic 
change? If unequally positioned, should a greater social obligation be 
placed on the one best positioned to respond?
* If government policies and actions increase the probability of closing a 
plant, can or should government policy be neutral towards the effects of 
closures?
*The statements of facts and the views expressed in this testimony are the sole 
responsibility of the author. The viewpoints do not necessarily represent 
positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
The resolution of the plant closure policy dilemma would be relatively 
straightforward if we could agree on the answers to these philosophical 
questions. But such agreement is unlikely because although we value individual 
freedom, profit maximization and equity, we have not agreed on the terms of 
trade among these three.
The dilemma facing the United States House of Representatives and the Civil 
Service system as RIFs are considered also is difficult and raises several of 
the complex philosophical questions listed above. But RIFs in the federal 
government do not involve the serious complication present in the private 
sector. Specifically, the United States Government, as an employer, does not 
need to worry that its actions will place it at a competitive disadvantage.
Private firms may have the perception that implementing a positive program 
to mitigate the negative impacts of closure will increase their costs and place 
them at a serious competitive disadvantage. Attempts by states to adopt 
legislation also are stalled due to fears of becoming "notorious" -- of holding 
industry hostage -- and being pegged as having a negative business climate.
Therefore, search for a general solution in the private sector faces 
several serious and binding constraints. First, action by individual states 
simply will exacerbate the economic development war between the states. Some 
states have acted, but there are strong incentives not to do anything. Second, 
although individual companies have established exemplary programs to mitigate 
the problems associated with plant closure, general adoption of such programs 
are not likely. Plant closure frequently is the result of financial problems 
brought on by competitive pressures. Positive closure programs may not be 
financially possible and/or will put a firm at even more of a competitive 
disadvantage. Finally, solutions must be consistent with the "managerial, 
institutional and political factors that determine the effectiveness of 
policies in practice".2 We are a nation that values individual freedom and 
profit maximization. Programs to mitigate the plant closure dilemma must 
attempt to keep these values in mind.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR EXEMPLARY PROGRAMS AND STATE INITIATIVES
Brown & Williamson's handling of its tobacco facility closure in 
Louisville, Kentucky is considered a model closure.3 It should be noted that 
Brown & Williamson was required to provide 18 months advance notice by the 
terms of its collective bargaining contract and the resulting program was 
achieved through collective bargaining. The key facets were as follows:
* A graduated severance pay program for both hourly and salaried 
employees.
* An early retirement option for workers whose age and experience equalled 
or exceeded 70.
* Continued life and medical insurance coverage for up to six months after 
leaving the company.
* Retraining programs for those remaining in the Louisville area.
* Group counseling for those displaced.
* A job placement program run by Brown & Williamson through which 
contracts were made with other employees.
Other exemplary programs in the private sector have been developed by the 
Dana Corporation, Empire-Detroit Steel, Ford Motor Company, Goodyear's Lee Tire 
Division and International Silver.4 These programs tended to have the 
following common features:
* Consultation regarding the closure
* Advance notice
* Counseling and motivation sessions
* Retraining
* Employer involvement in finding new employment
* Extension of health insurance benefits
The states have attempted two major types of plant closure policy 
initiatives. The first has been to prescribe the behavior of firms intending 
to close. Advance notice, continued wage payments, and severance payments to 
workers and communities are elements of this type of initiative. In some 
respects, the purpose of these requirements has been to make closure so onerous 
that firms would not carry through the threat. The second type has been to 
develop assistance programs for those workers displaced including job clubs, 
retraining, job search skills and relocation assistance. This approach has 
been adopted more frequently by individual states since the more prescriptive 
types of governmental action may place a state at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-a-vis other states.
An interesting example of this move away from prescription is the change in 
the Wisconsin state law.5 In 1975 the Wisconsin legislature adopted a 60-day 
advance notice requirement in cases of plant closure. That requirement has 
since been repealed and replaced by voluntary guidelines combined with 
incentives in the form of positive adjustment assistance.
Massachusetts, 1984 legislation is a blend of the two types of 
initiatives. It incorporates the following provisions:
* reemployment assistance
* supplemental unemployment benefits must be paid for 13 weeks when 
advance notice of severance pay are not provided.
* economic stabilization fund to offer reduced interest rate funds for 
plant modernization
* a social compact expecting 90 days advance notice to workers prior to 
shutdown.
III. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STRATEGY
The policy question surrounding plant closure is: How can a policy be 
constructed that is minimally disruptive, yet it is effective at correcting the 
problem?
The plant closure problem must be placed in perspective. What is its 
magnitude? Since no governmental agency is charged with recording the closing 
of a plant or counting the number of workers directly affected, its exact 
magnitude is unknown. Two independent sources, a survey of Fortune 500 firms 
by Roger Schmenner and the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. tabulations 
indicate that approximately one percent of the manufacturing establishments are 
closed each year.6 in 1982, that meant 424 Closures of manufacturing 
facilities putting 146,900 employees out of work.
Why collective bargaining as a tool to alleviate the problem of plant 
closure and dislocated workers? First, a significant proportion of closures 
takes place in unionized facilities. Whereas 52 percent of the facilities 
surveyed by Schmenner were unionized, 66 percent of the closings involved 
unionized facilities.7 Second, the reasons cited for closure in surveys and 
in court cases tend to be amenable to resolution through collective 
bargaining. Schmenner 1 s survey revealed that 21 percent of the respondents 
cited high labor rates, 17 percent listed price competition due to lower cost 
labor, and 10 percent indicated crippling union work rules. (Multiple 
responses were permitted.) Reasons cited in court cases have included low 
productivity, high wages, and inflexible work rules. Thus, the reasons cited 
for closing frequently are topics that have been and could be handled through 
the collective bargaining process.
Reich has argued that desired social goals could be achieved more 
efficiently through bargaining rather than regulation.8 Collective 
bargaining can address the specific problems of the plant and may be able to 
tailor a solution that meets the needs of all parties. Legislation cannot 
possibly accommodate all of the varied circumstances in which closure is being 
considered. Sometimes, the best solution for all will be the end of 
production. In other circumstances, changes in wages, operating procedures and 
the division of responsibilities would result in profitable operations and 
continued employment. (A 1983 study documented one situation in which a 25 
percent cut in wages and changes in work rules were necessary to make the 
employee owned company competitive).9 Furthermore, if collective bargaining 
could lead to profitable operations and continued employment, some older 
workers would not be faced with the prospect of seeking new employment while 
possessing outdated skills, nor would the economic impact on the community be 
as severe.
The reasons listed above suggest that not only may the plant closure 
problem be amenable to mitigation through collective bargaining, but using 
collective bargaining may be more consistent with institutional and political 
considerations than direct regulation.
However, the problem in the private sector is that judicial interpretations 
of the National Labor Relations Act have not found the decision to close to be 
a mandatory topic of bargaining. Therfore, firms could unilaterally close a 
plant. Furthermore, unions either showed no interest or were not able to 
obtain plant closure protections into the collectively bargained contract. In 
1974, only 14 percent of the major contracts covering manufacturing firms had 
advance notice provisions. Little changed by 1980 when 15 percent of the 
contracts contained advance notice provisions. (See Table 1).
Therefore, it is necessary to afford workers the opportunity to negotiate 
over the decision to close a plant and this would require amending the National 
Labor Relations Act's definition of mandatory topics of bargaining under "terms 
and other conditions of employment" to include bargaining over the decision to 
close. There are positive and negative aspects of this approach. The most 
obvious negative aspect is that the NLRA covers only those plants and 
workplaces where employees have elected a bargaining agent. A positive feature 
is that coverage is uniform throughout the United States, thereby not entering 
this issue into competition among the states.
TABLE 1 
Percent of Contracts Containing Plant Closure Protections
PROVISION
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits 
Severance Pay 
Relocation Assistance
Transfer to New Plant
Hiring Rights at New Plant 
Advance Notice of Closure
Advance Notice of Technological Change
1974 
Percent
22 
39 
8
15
5 
14
10
1980 
Percent
26 
38 
11
19
7 
15
11
Number of Contracts 631 676
Source:Computer runs by Wayne Wendling from Characteristics of Major 
Collective Bargaining Agreements.
The basic premise is that management and labor will want to obtain a 
bargain that leads to profitable operations and is the best alternative in the 
labor market. If the bargain necessary to maintain profitable operations 
requires wage cuts or changes in work rules greater than necessary as dictated 
by market alternatives, no agreement will or should be reached. If operations 
more profitable than the alternative can be achieved, management will and 
should-stay at the existing plant. If no agreement is possible within the 
parameters, it would be inefficient for management and labor to continue at 
that location.
Neither management nor labor have perfect foresight. Formal negotiations 
every two or three years cannot accommodate all contingencies. Equity 
considerations suggest that workers be afforded the opportunity to minimize 
eaarnings and/or job loss. Recognizing that doing so also imposes costs on 
employers, it is necessary that bargaining over closure be flexible and 
expedited.
IV. COMMENTS ON H.R. 6080
I must preface my comments on H.R. 6080 with the statement that I am not a 
student of either the United States Civil Service or collective bargaining by 
federal employees. Therefore, I have only limited knowledge of the frequency 
and scope of bargained contracts by federal employees. My comments will be 
based on the assumption that certain lessons learned from the private sector 
are transferable.
Reductions-in-Force (RIFs) are likely to impact federal employees in the 
same way a plant closure affects its victims. The most observable impact is 
the earnings loss, which has several components. First, there is the direct 
and immediate earnings loss due to job separation. Second, initial 
reemployment earnings may be less because available employment opportunities 
simply do not pay as much as the previous position. Third, total earnings over
the entire career span may be less because the career has been disrupted. 
Other effects of plant closure such as a decline in health status, marital 
instability also seem to be transferable to RIFs.
The federal government must be prepared to respond to changes in the needs 
and priorities of its citizens. The role of one agency may be diminished 
whereas another's may be increased. Although the skills and training of 
employees may not be directly transferable across agencies, the private and 
social costs of unemployment suggest that alternate avenues should be 
investigated to insure that unemployment is the option of last resort.
As indicated in my discussion of the private sector, the reasons for 
closing a plant frequently are issues that have been or could be resolved 
through collective bargaining. RIFs could be viewed as one solution to a 
problem   taxpayers are not willing to support the service an agency provides 
at the particular cost -- which might have another solution   improving 
productivity and reducing the relative cost of providing the service. Both 
productivity enhancements and cost reductions are suitable topics of collective 
bargaining. Furthermore, recent experiences with labor-management cooperation 
initiatives have shown instances of significant cost savings and productivity 
improvements when workers and managers are pulling in the same direction JO
Protections are built in the collective bargaining approach. If managers 
attempt to extract excessive concessions, the employees will leave because more 
favorable alternatives are available in the market, and the most valued 
employees are likely to be the first to leave. Furthermore, the information 
that managers must supply should insure realistic parameters being 
established. If a solution cannot be achieved within the parameters of the 
market, that should be the signal that the service cannot be afforded. At that 
point our attention should turn to mitigating the impact on the employee.
As we look back at the key elements of the exemplary private sector 
initiatives, several points stand out.
* The employer was involved in helping the employee find new employment.
* There were opportunities for retraining.
H.R. 6080 has attempted to incorporate these points from exemplary private 
sector program, but with a twist. The federal government is a very significant 
employer in a number of labor markets, and the largest in some. H.R. 6080 
proposes that the federal government help employees who might be RIFd find 
alternate employment in the federal service. In the private sector, firms may 
differ in wage schedules, employment practices and hiring procedures, but none 
of these potential stumbling blocks exist in the federal government. Thus, 
there should be even greater probability of success in placing RIFd employees 
within the federal service.
H.R. 6080 also incorporates a retraining provision similar to those in 
exemplary programs. This provision goes hand-in-hand with the one described 
above. The skills of those losing their jobs will not always match those 
needed in the available opportunities. The period of retraining is reasonable 
-- 180 days   and similar to the period provided in other training programs. 
Recall that there also is a period of training associated with new hires. 
However, periods of retraining longer than 180 days may be counterproductive 
because they could impair the cost-effective delivery of service by the agency.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The plant closure problem in the private sector is not resolved. 
Insufficient effort has been directed to finding workable solutions to keeping 
plants open. Collective bargaining over the decision to close is an avenue 
that should be considered more seriously. But when closure is the only 
reasonable alternative, some private sector firms have established exemplary 
programs to assist those displaced workers' transition to reemployment.
However, the fundamental thrusts of H.R. 6080 are consistent with proposals 
and best practices in the private sector. First, the attempt to find an 
alternative to RIFs would rely heavily on negotiations and bargaining in the 
federal service. Second, the reemployment of RIFd federal employees would be 
aided by establishing a government wide placement system. Third, if the skills 
match is problematic, retraining for specific positions would be an option.
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September 8, 1984
Mr. John Fitzgerald, Counsel
Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
U.S. House of Representatives
House Annex I, Room 511
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Fitzgerald:
Enclosed is the written testimony that will serve as the basis of my oral 
presentation before the Subcommittee on Human Resources on September 13, 1984 
If you have any questions concerning points in the testimony, please do not 
hesitate to contact me.
Thank you for the opportunity to report on exemplary practices from the 
private sector and comment on H.R. 6080.
Sincerely,
<r
Wayne R. Wendling 
Senior Economist
/c 
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